INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the cold war it appears that customary international law 1 has taken a normative legal shift from traditional prohibitions against forcible intervention in the internal affairs of states, toward the recognition of a right to humanitarian intervention 2 by groups of states and regional actors 3 in internal conflicts. 4 Although a role for regional organizations in hu- 3. A regional actor may be defined as any regional organization, agency, entity or arrangement made up of and empowered by states to represent their interests, whether economic, political, military, social, cultural or religious.
4. For an exemplary article discussing U.N. action in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia, arguing that "international law today recognizes, as a matter of practice, the legitimacy of collective forcible humanitarian intervention -of military measures authorized by the Security Council for the purpose of remedying serious human rights viola-manitarian intervention has been established, until the advent of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 5 states' practices suggested that prior approval by the Security Council was a prerequisite to any humanitarian intervention. 6 However, for the first time the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone provide two clear examples of unilateral humanitarian intervention by a regional actor that enjoyed support from the whole of the international community. 7 Likewise, for the first time there exists contemporary examples of popular humanitarian interventions that have derived their legal basis from customary international [Vol. 12.2 law, rather than the U.N. Charter. The ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in the Central African Republic (CAR) are cases in point. 9 As a result, the customary international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention seems to have been "revived. ' .
For purposes of this article, "humanitarian intervention" can be taken to mean: Intervention in a state involving the use of force (U.N. action in Iraq and Somalia or ECOWAS action in Liberia and Sierra Leone) or threat of force (U.N. action in Haiti), where the intervenor deploys armed forces and, at the least, makes clear that it is willing to use force if its operation is resisted -as it attempts to alleviate conditions in which a substantial part of the population of a state is threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale."
Presently, customary international law appears to recognize four exceptions to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic or internal affairs of states: (1) when a de jure government requests or consents to intervention; (2) when a group of states or a regional actor invokes a right to humanitarian intervention; (3) when a state acts in self-defense; and (4) counterintervention by a state to offset an illegal prior intervention by another state .
Moreover, in consonance with the above exceptions, international law
See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant To Resolution 1136 (1997) Concerning The Situation
In the Central African Republic, 53rd. sess., U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/1998/61 (1998).
9. See id. On January 31, 1997, the Heads of State of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali established MISAB to restore "peace and security in the Central African Republic by monitoring the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and conducting operations to disarm the former rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed persons." Id. According to the United Nations, on February 8, 1997, "MISAB was deployed in Bangui, comprising a total of some 800 troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon and Mali; and later from Senegal and Togo, under the military command of Gabon and with logistical and financial support of France." Id. 10. Yet, many commentators remain steadfast in their non-interventionist trenches, maintaining that international law does not recognize any right to humanitarian intervention. See L. OPPENHEIM 425,446 (1995-96) . However, Wippman states that some of these justifications, at least in particular applications, are not without controversy. See id. seems to recognize the following four types of intervention: (1) unilateral intervention by a state or group of states acting on their own initiative (United States and allies in Iraq, MISAB in the CAR and Nigeria in Sierra Leone); (2) unilateral intervention by a regional actor acting on its own initiative (ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone); (3) intervention authorized by the United Nations but not taken by it (United States in Somalia and Haiti, and France and Senegal in Rwanda); and (4) intervention taken by the United Nations (Liberia, Yugoslavia and the CAR). The foregoing article is primarily concerned with unilateral intervention as described in (2) above. But, in an attempt to determine when the international community condones humanitarian intervention, reference will be made to the other types of intervention.
The legal basis for unilateral intervention is different from an intervention taken under the authority of the United Nations. On this point Christopher Greenwood comments:
Intervention might be the unilateral action of a state or group of allies or an operation conducted under the authority of the United Nations. But the legal issues would be different. United Nations intervention would have to be based on powers conferred by the U.N. Charter, whereas any right of unilateral intervention could only be derived from customary international law. Specifically, it may be said that an intervention which falls under either (1) or (2) above derives its legal basis from customary international law, whereas an intervention under (3) and (4) derives its basis from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
This article concludes that today customary international law seems to provide for an exception to the international law prohibition against unilateral intervention in the domestic or internal affairs of states.' The international community seems to be witnessing the initial stages of a shift in the law de lege ferenda, and sanctioning unilateral humanitarian intervention by groups of states or regional actors in internal conflicts. 5 The law de lege lata appears to permit unilateral humanitarian intervention by groups of states or regional actors in three instances: (1) when there are human rights abuses within a state that are so egregious as to violate the jus cogens norms of international law; 16 (2) when a state has collapsed and is withering into a state 13. Greenwood, supra note 11, at 34.
14. See Report on U.N. Decade of International Law, G.A. Res. 50, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/368 (1995). The resolution calls on member states to promote acceptance of and respect for the principles of international law, and encourage its progressive development.
15. Unilateral humanitarian intervention can be taken to mean humanitarian intervention by a group of states or regional actor which has its legal basis in customary international law rather than the U.N. Charter. The term de lege ferenda is "the law as it may be, or should be, in the future" and the term de lege lata is "the law as it currently stands." 16. A jus cogens norm, also known as a "peremptory norm" of international law "is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a [Vol. 12.2 of anarchy; 17 and (3) to safeguard democracy when a democratic government has been violently and illegally dislodged against the will of its domestic population." 8 The above should be viewed as the normative criteria on which humanitarian intervention should be based. (1995) . In this instance, collective forcible intervention may be meant to avert deadly conflict (Haiti and Sierra Leone), or restore democracy in a "collapsed state" (Somalia). The United Nations' threat of force against the junta in Haiti may have prevented violent conflict between pro-Aristide supporters and the military junta. Similarly, ECOMOG action in Sierra Leone appears to have prevented internal deadly conflict between the civilian population and military junta. Nevertheless, it can be argued that this criterion falls outside the scope of humanitarian intervention, and may be better associated with the doctrine of self-determination. However, the humanitarian crises that stem from such circumstances propels it into the humanitarian intervention theatre. See Reisman, supra note 4, at 794.
19. These criteria are only concerned with the "substantive basis" justifying "entry" into a sovereign state. For other sources enumerating substantive and "procedural" criteria, see Richard B. Lillich The distinction between U.N. 'enforcement action' and 'peacekeeping' has increasingly become blurred, due to new kinds of operations (often labeled 'second generation peacekeeping' or 'mixed peacekeeping' which may include some enforcement elements). Indeed, the terminology concerning U.N. peacekeeping has recently become rather confusing. AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 416, (Peter Malanczuk ed., 1997). Henceforth, for purposes of this article, "peace enforcement" means proportionate forcible military action, through deployment of forces, to threaten or engage an individual, group, entity or government, to comply with lawful directives as proscribed by international law.
22. Chapter VII Article 39 action refers to "[a]ction with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." U.N. CHARTER art. 39. para. 1. Arguably, the Security Council authorized Chapter VII Article 42 action to varying degrees in each case mentioned below. See infra notes 22-27.
23. See S.C. Res. 678., U.N. SCOR, 2963rd. mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/678 (1990) (authorizing collective forcible military intervention to propel Iraqi forces from Kuwait); See also S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 2982nd mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/688 (1991) (calling for an end to Iraqi repression, and insisting that Iraq "allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations" to provide relief.).
24. See S.C. Res. 767, U.N. SCOR, 3101st. mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/767 (1992) (deciding that "the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security."); See also S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) (authorizing a U.S.-led military force to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.").
25. See S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 3106th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/770 (1992) (empowering states "to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the U.N. the delivery.. .of humanitarian assistance ... in ... Bosnia-Herzegovina."); see also S.C.Res 816, U.N. SCOR, 3191st. mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/816 (1993) (authorizing member states to take "all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of [Vol. 12.2 strate when the international community appears to support unilateral humanitarian intervention, the above cases will be discussed; the ECOWASLiberian intervention will be discussed in Part II, the United Nations and MISAB interventions in Part III, and the Nigeria and ECOWAS interventions in Sierra Leone in Part IV.
Since ECOWAS is comprised of sixteen sovereign states, and the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were supported by the majority of independent states, 9 it can be said that the interventions were supported by the opinio juris and practice of states. "Foreign intervention in internal conflicts is more the rule than the exception.
3 2 The ECOWAS, U.N., MISAB and Nigerian interventions referred to above evidence this position, demarcating a normative legal shift toward international recognition of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention by regional actors in internal conflicts.
A. Humanitarian Intervention
The international community seems to agree that states should not be allowed to hide behind the cloak of "sovereignty" or "domestic jurisdiction" when committing grave human rights violations. Further, it seems to condone intervention to avert anarchy when a state has collapsed, or safeguard democracy when a de jure government has been violently and illegally dislodged against the volition of its domestic population. In these circumstances, the international community appears to support humanitarian intervention. Certainly, U.N. action since 1990 supports this notion. For example, the United Nations Security Council "has authorized military intervention to end repression of the Kurds in Iraq, famine in Somalia, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and genocide in Rwanda. Even the overthrow of the democratic government of Haiti sufficed to prompt the Security Council to authorize military intervention.
3 3 In light of the above, Tes6n argues:
[I]international law today recognizes, as a matter of practice, the legitimacy of collective forcible humanitarian intervention of military measures authorized by the Security Council for the purpose of remedying serious human rights violations. While traditionally the only ground for collective military action has been the need to respond to breaches of the peace, especially aggression, the international community now has accepted a norm that allows collective humanitarian intervention to respond to serious human rights abuses.' [Vol. 12.2 ous human rights abuses., 3 1 What one country views as "serious" another may not; thus in the legal sense, such a standard is far too ambiguous. In this context, humanitarian intervention should only be justified when responding to human rights abuses that are so grave that they violate the jus cogens norms of international law (to persecute, oppress, exterminate, enslave or deport civilian populations).
In the Barcelona Traction case in 1970, the International Court of Justice stated that certain basic human rights, such as the protection from genocide, slavery and racial discrimination, are obligations erga omnes. 36 In addition, referring to Article 19 of the International Law Commission's U.N. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, "a serious breach on a widespread scale of the international obligations of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid," is an "international crime."
37 Likewise, the works of the Nuremberg, Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals evidence that these criteria have been accepted as non-derogable norms of international law.
Further, consistent with ECOWAS action in Liberia and Sierra Leone, MISAB action in the CAR, and U.N. action in Liberia, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti and the CAR, today, when a government collapses or has been violently and illegally dislodged against the will of its domestic population, the international community seems to have accepted a norm that permits unilateral humanitarian intervention to forestall grave human rights abuses, to avert a state's descent into anarchy, and to safeguard democracy.
II. ECOWAS AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE CASE
OF LIBERIA Any contemporary discussion regarding the validity or existence of the customary international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention requires a discussion of the quintessential case of Liberia. The ECOMOG mission in Liberia marks the first time the international community as a whole has supported unilateral humanitarian intervention by a group of states (regional actors) in a purely domestic conflict.
The following sections will provide the historical events which led to the ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in 1991; discuss the legality of intervention by ECOWAS-ECOMOG under international law; and determine whether ECOWAS was entitled to invoke a right to humanitarian intervention. 35 Monrovia. 4 5 Around this time, one of Taylor's senior commanders, Prince Yormie Johnson, broke from the NPLF and formed his own group, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). The INPFL seemingly had no concrete objective other than to wage war against the NPLF and the Government of Liberia. Johnson's split from Taylor was only a minor setback for the NPLF, which continued its campaign.
Doe's American-backed army suffered large losses, as it was defeated in nearly every engagement. Doe, facing certain defeat, made unsuccessful appeals for assistance to the people of Liberia and the U.S. Government. Disgruntled and impaired by the collapse of his government, Doe appealed to ECOWAS to introduce a "[p]eace-keeping force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension .... "46
Since ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were not able to mediate a peaceful end to the conflict, 47 on August 7, 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee decided to establish an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) for Liberia. Interim President." Participants at the conference stated that they created the new government because of the "total breakdown of law and order, the prevailing state of war, the massive loss of life, the displacement of the citizens, and the collapse of the government of President Samuel K. Doe."' 5 Charles Taylor's NPLF refused to attend the Banjul Conference, and did not recognize the Interim Government." On September 9, 1990, approximately one week after the "Peace Conference," Prince Johnson's guerrillas ambushed and kidnapped Doe at the ECOWAS headquarters in Monrovia, and murdered him at the NPLF's Caldwell Base in the Barclay center. .56
Letter addressed by President Samuel K. Doe to the Chairman and Members of the Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation

B. ECOWAS-ECOMOG and the Legality of Intervention
This section will discuss the legality of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. Specifically, it will concentrate on the validity of the intervention under customary international law and the post de jure authentication of the operation by the United Nations Security Council.
If it can be shown that ECOWAS' "purpose" for intervention was to support Doe's regime, the intervention would be deemed illegal under cus- avail. 63 The United States viewed the Liberian conflict as an internal affair, to be solved by Liberians themselves. ' Certainly, the United States did not use an internal affairs test when it intervened in the internal conflicts in the Philippines, Nicaragua, Panama, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti, albeit the latter two with U.N. authorization. Apparently, Liberia's foreign policy stock devalued in the post-Cold War era. Yet, according to Herman J. Cohen, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, between 1980 and 1990, Doe's regime received $67 million in military assistance from the U.S. government, not including an estimated $1.5 million for the fiscal year 1991. 6 ' Initially, like the United States, the United Nations did not intervene in the Liberian conflict. Wippman states that this was partly due to opposition by C6te d'Ivoire, which was sympathetic to Taylor, and Ethiopia and Zaire, which did not want to set an "intrusive" precedent. 6 As history has shown, had the West favored intervention, those in opposition would have submitted. Only after the United States denied assistance and the United Nations failed to respond in a timely fashion did ECOWAS take it upon itself to intervene. 67 Humanitarian justifications aside, nowhere in the U.N. Charter does it state that a regional agency may forcibly intervene in an internal conflict if the United Nations does not. 6' According to Chapter VIII Article 53 of the U.N. Charter, "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without authorization of the Security Council .... , Clearly, ECOWAS did not obtain authorization from the United Nations before it intervened in Liberia. 70 Therefore, unless ECOWAS could justify intervention on some other legal basis, the intervention would appear to have been unlawful.
In order for a regional actor to take military enforcement action, it must be empowered to do so by its organizing instrument or subsequent protocol or treaty. 71 The ECOWAS Treaty of 1975 did not provide for a regional security mechanism to deal with "purely" internal conflicts. 72 Moreover, nei-63. However, the U.S. did evacuate American and foreign personnel from Liberia. [Vol. 12.2 ther the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression, 7 nor the ECOWAS Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense, 7 empowers ECOWAS to take enforcement action in purely internal conflicts (conflicts which do not enjoy external assistance). Therefore, unless it can be shown that ECOWAS validly invoked a right to humanitarian intervention, the intervention must be deemed unlawful, since there appears to have been no legal basis for the intervention under international law.
Although there was no legal basis for the ECOWAS intervention under the U.N. Charter, it was supported by the United Nations and the whole of the international community. In fact, "[bjetween 22 January 1991 and 27 November 1996, the Council adopted fifteen resolutions directly relating to the situation in Liberia, in addition, the President of the Security Council issued nine statements in this connection." 75 In virtually every resolution and statement, the United Nations commended ECOWAS for its efforts, not once making reference to ECOMOG's "offensive" use of force; in effect, this tacitly legitimized such force. On November 19, 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 788, calling for a complete weapons embargo against Liberia. The embargo did not apply to ECOWAS. Ten months later, on September 22, 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 866 which called for the creation of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), and stated "that this would be the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peacekeeping mission already set up by another organization, in this case ECOWAS.
''76 Hence, it can be said that Resolutions 788 and 866 placed a retroactive de jure seal on the ECOWAS intervention.
C. ECOWAS-ECOMOG and "Humanitarian Intervention"
This section will discuss the relevant substantive legal issues which arise when examining the legality of external intervention by states in the domes- [Vol. 12.2 lion of some magnitude, it is by definition not in de facto control and thus cannot speak for the state. Hence, as Taylor's forces took control of "greater" Liberia, Doe's government and military crumbled, in effect making Taylor the only de facto ruler. As a result, no individual had legal standing to represent the state as a whole. Nevertheless, according to Doswald-Beck, the "existence of de facto control is generally the most important criterion in dealing with a regime as representing the state." That being the case, in order for the ECOMOG operation to have qualified as a lawful "peace-keeping" mission, ECOWAS would have needed to obtain Taylor's consent prior to intervention. Moreover, despite claims to the contrary, Sawyer could not have consented to intervention because he was not elected interim president of Liberia until five days after the intervention took place. Furthermore, the interim government was not created until August 29, 1990, approximately one week before the death of Doe. Therefore, Sawyer did not possess the legal authority to authorize intervention, as Doe was still considered the de jure Head of State.
By July 1990, Doe's regime had completely collapsed. By late August 1990, Liberia seems to have had three leaders, as Taylor, Doe, and Sawyer claimed to be head of state. Still, Doe's regime would have to be considered more legally valid than Sawyer's new government. Sawyer's interim government lacked de jure status for four primary reasons: (1) Doe was still alive; (2) at this stage, Sawyer's interim government did not control any territory in Liberia; (3) the interim government was not yet recognized by the international community, and (4) it is unclear whether the election of the interim government was lawful under the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia.
Surely, in the legal sense, referring to the Banjul Conference, political acquiescence by various political entities and elites would not suffice to create a de jure government. Nor would it negate claims by Taylor (the de facto ruler) to be President of Liberia." By late July 1990, since Taylor was the only de facto ruler, he appears to have been the only domestic authority entitled to authorize intervention. At the very least, ECOWAS needed to obtain Taylor's consent prior to intervention. It is a well established fact that it did not.
Under international law, a government may request foreign assistance to thwart internal disorder or restore rule. However, as previously stated, international law does not permit intervention to quash civil war. Once conflict has exploded into violent civil war, foreign intervention on behalf of either party is illegal. In an attempt to prevent Taylor from taking Monrovia, ECOMOG launched offensive missile attacks by land and air against the NPLF.
93 At times, ECOMOG seemed less like a "peace-making force" and more like an unintended party to the conflict. Notwithstanding, ECOMOG action must be viewed in light of its mandate to stop the war and restore law and order.
ECOWAS seems to have validly invoked a right to humanitarian intervention because the de jure government of Liberia collapsed, causing the state to slide into anarchy, which resulted in death and suffering on a grand scale. Moreover, the intervention marked the first time that unilateral hu- [Vol. 12.2 manitarian intervention by a group of states (regional actors) in a purely internal matter was supported by the whole of the international community, and the first time the United Nations co-deployed with another organization already in the field. 94 Commenting on the ECOWAS intervention, Wippman remarks, "[tihe legitimacy of humanitarian intervention under international law is, of course, much debated. But for those who believe it is or should be considered lawful, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia satisfies virtually every proposed test, and in many respects constitutes an excellent model." 9 5 In retrospect, considering the international community's response to the MISAB intervention in the CAR, and the ECOWAS mission in Sierra Leone, it may also be the case that the Liberian intervention generated instant customary international law or "diritto spontaneo," namely, that unilateral humanitarian intervention by groups of states in domestic conflicts is lawful. Since 1990,9 the United Nations has engaged in more peace-keeping activities than at any other time in the organization's history. 98 Although the following case studies derive their legal basis from the U.N. Charter and not customary international law, 9 9 they sequentially demarcate new trends in international law and U.N. practice. Furthermore, all six interventions occurred during the Liberian Civil War and prior to the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone. In order to properly assess new trends which have developed with regard to the validity of forcible military intervention in states for humanitarian ends, it is necessary to examine the following case studies chronologically (Iraq 1991, Somalia 1992, Yugoslavia 1992, Rwanda 1993, Haiti 1993, and the CAR 1997). These cases offer valuable insight into when the international community is willing to condone the puncturing of 97. Ironically, during the eight year (1989-1997) civil war in Liberia, the United Nations engaged in "peace-enforcement" activities in Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Haiti.
98. The character and nature of such missions have also changed. The United Nations appears more willing to use "force" as a means to obtain compliance with its mandates.
99. Except for the CAR which derived its legal basis for customary international law and the U.N. Charter. The Security Council passed several resolutions with regard to the CAR crises.
states' sovereignty for humanitarian ends. As a result, it can be argued that the Security Council has been used as a mechanism to legitimize humanitarian intervention.
A.Iraq
Whether or not Iraq's ruthless attacks upon its Kurdish people in Northern Iraq amounted to a breach of the jus cogens norms of international law as defined by Nuremberg is debatable. If commentators agree that it was, then perhaps intervention by the United States and coalition forces was justified on humanitarian grounds. However, this assertion is difficult to make because the United States, which led the assault, interpreted Security Council Resolution 688 to authorize it to take military enforcement action. However, nowhere in the resolution does it authorize the use of force against Iraq."° On the contrary, it reaffirms "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in the area . [Vol. 12.2 tion, the United States and its allies may have been entitled to invoke a right to humanitarian intervention.' 8 The United States did not obtain Iraq's consent prior to intervention; rather it justified intervention on humanitarian grounds (namely to avert further human rights violations by Iraq against the Kurds) and seemingly used proportionate military force to achieve its objective.
1°7 However, at no time did the United States or allied forces claim a right to humanitarian intervention. Even if they had, as previously stated, it is questionable whether Iraq's nefarious acts toward the Kurds were egregious enough to justify puncturing its sovereignty. Furthermore, it would be difficult to classify "unprovoked" air strikes as a form of humanitarian intervention, as the doctrine seems to call for some type of ground presence in the target state. Therefore, if the United States and allied forces had claimed a right to humanitarian intervention, their assertion would have appeared insupportable. Perhaps this explains the absence of such a claim.
However, it must be noted that the United States' action in Iraq could be seen "partly in the special context of post-war actions by victors in the territory of defeated adversaries."
'0 8 However, for this to have been the case, it must be shown that Iraq breached an agreement which delineated intervention as a consequence of the breach. No such agreement has been cited.
Since there appears to be no consensus as to the legal validity or justification for U.S. intervention in Iraq, it would seem unlikely that the U.S.'s action would set a precedent. On the other hand, in certain instances it may signify the international community's willingness to condone forcible military action by the United Nations or states, even if such action appears to have no legal basis under the U.N. Charter or customary international law, regardless of whether a formal attestation to humanitarian intervention has been made. Or, it may simply be that the international community is not prepared to hold the Great Powers accountable for acting unlawfully. Whatever the case may be, U.S. and allied action in Iraq would seem to qualify as some form of unilateral humanitarian action, not intervention.
B. Somalia
Although U.N. action in Somalia was a clear case of humanitarian intervention, '°9 some commentators disagree with this assertion."° In essence, .. Such an argument is contradictory. If one accepts the contention that intervention without consent is a decisive criterion for action to qualify as humanitarian intervention, it would seem illogical to argue that a legal central authority must exist to not give consent in order for humanitarian intervention to be valid.
1 12 If this were the case, a group of states, a regional actor, or the United Nations would never be able to legally invoke a right to humanitarian intervention once a government has collapsed or withered into a state of anarchy. The Somalia case reveals that when the de jure government of a state dissolves and nothing takes its place (except wide spread civil war or anarchy), what exists is a "collapsed state.
1 3 Typically, collapsed states cannot give consent because such states do not have an operable central authority. Thus, unless commentators are willing to argue that the existence of a central authority is an obligatory prerequisite for military intervention in a state to qualify as humanitarian intervention, arguments which maintain that a government must exist to give or refuse consent would appear to be fruitless. Moreover, customary international law does not support such an assertion.
The events in Somalia were unprecedented because "the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) and the United Nationssanctioned and United States-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) represented one of the rare cases in which an international military force was deployed in large measure to deal with a humanitarian crisis.'. 4 Likewise, "[t]his was the first time that an unambiguously internal and humanitarian crisis had been designated as a threat to international peace and security, thus justifying peace enforcement measures.'. 5 Moreover, another precedential aspect of U.N. action in Somalia was UNOSOM II's broad mandate The case of Somalia evidences that the international community appears to support unilateral humanitarian intervention by groups of states or regional actors when states collapse and descend into anarchy due to civil war.
C. Yugoslavia
The United Nations acted on the request of the Yugoslav government when it interceded in the former Yugoslavia." 7 The character of the forces deployed comported with that of traditional U.N. peace-keeping missions, as they were deployed pursuant to a cease-fire and were not mandated to use force. However, as the conflict escalated, the United Nations seemed willing to take all necessary measures to bring peace and security to Yugoslavia, including an extension and enlargement of the U.N. Protection Force As a result, the Security Council adopted numerous additional resolutions which forestalled Serb aggression and hostility toward Bosnian Muslims and UNPROFOR personnel. According to Captain Davis L. Brown of the United States Air Force, the resolutions justified NATO air strikes against Serbian missile sites and ground radars, and at times advancing or hostile Serbian ground units. NATO flew more than 23,000 sorties in this regard. cording to Captain Brown, compelled NATO to take "offensive action" in the form of air strikes against Bosnian Serb headquarters in Pale. ' Hence, similar to the interventions in Iraq and Somalia, U.N. action in Yugoslavia demonstrates that the international community is willing to condone the use of force to prevent mass killing and combat tyranny."
D.Rwanda
U.N. peace-keeping activities in Rwanda date back to October 5, 1993.
3
On June 22, 1993, pursuant to requests by both the government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, the Security Council adopted Resolution 846, establishing the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border and "ensure that no military assistance reaches Rwanda."' 2 4 On August 4, 1993 both factions signed a peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania. Likewise, the U.N. reports that there were over 250,000 displaced persons and approximately 400,000 refugees in Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire.
1 32 Overwhelmed by the conflict, on May 2, 1994, the Rwandese government requested that the Security Council strengthen UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda.
"3 On May 17, 1994, the Security Council authorized UNAMIR II, which expanded the mission's force to 5500 troops, to provide security to displaced persons, refugees and civilians.' However, due to a lack of support and logistical equipment needed to make UNAMIR II fully operational and timely, the Secretary General suggested that the Security Council consider France's proposal to create a French-led multi-national force:
In these circumstances, the Security Council may wish to consider the offer of the Government of France to undertake, subject to Security Council authorization, a French-commanded multinational operation in conjunction with other Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. Such an operation was one of the options envisaged in my letter of 29 April (S/1994/518) and precedent exists for it in the United States-led operation Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) which was deployed in Somalia in December 1992.135 Furthermore, the Secretary-General advised the Security Council that if it decided to authorize the plan, member states which have contingents in UNAMIR would be asked to keep such contingents in Rwanda "until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength to take over from the multinational force and the latter has created the conditions in which a peacekeeping force operating under Chapter VII would have the capacity to carry out its mandate. 136 International responses to the tragic events in Rwanda were poor and shameful. If there was any lesson learned from the case of Rwanda, it is that states are reluctant to put their own national contingents at risk when there is no overwhelming national interest.' 4° Nevertheless, U.N. action in Rwanda was still a clear case of humanitarian intervention, as it showed the United Nations' willingness to intervene in internal conflicts to avert genocide. Moreover, it appears that the Security Council may have intended to set a precedent in Somalia and Rwanda and, as a result, will undoubtedly turn to states and regional actors to assist in the maintenance of international peace and security in the future.
E.Haiti
The case of Haiti should be viewed in light of the previously examined interventions. The Security Council has authorized states to halt genocide (Yugoslavia and Rwanda), restore law and order to collapsed states (Somalia and Liberia), protect humanitarian workers and civilians (the Central African Republic and Iraq) and restore democratic institutions (Somalia). Hence, it should come as no surprise that it would also seek to "safeguard" democratic institutions, the absence of which gives rise to violent conflict.
The Haiti intervention was important because it signified the international community's willingness to defend democratic institutions14 by insuring that democracy prevails in states which have been shaken by violent, illegal and unpopular coups (i.e., those which do not enjoy support from the civilian populace).
On 146 This was the first time the Security Council authorized military force to remove a de facto government from power, and the first time a group of states were authorized to restore democracy as opposed to law and order."
In order to avoid a U.S.-led "peace invasion," the military junta "agreed to resign when a general amnesty would be voted into law by the Haitian Parliament, or by 15 October 1994, which ever was earlier."' 14 By October 10th, with peace looming, the twenty-eight-nation multi-national force, consisting of 21,000 troops, began to scale down. Soon after, the United Nations Mission for Haiti (UNMIH) replaced the multinational force and assisted the de jure government to restore democracy. U.N. intervention in Haiti represents a unique case, as there was never a genuine threat to international peace and security. 149 The military junta did not commit grave human rights violations (as did Hutus in Rwanda), and the state did not collapse or slide into anarchy (as occurred in Liberia and Somalia). Nonetheless, Security Council Resolution 940 may have been the most aggressive resolution ever adopted. Perhaps, Resolution 940 best evidences the international community's willingness to use military force to avert violent conflict and defend democratic institutions.
15° Certainly, the international community had witnessed more than enough blood-shed in Liberia, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. However, in Haiti, power was handed over with little incident. The U.S.-led operation in Haiti was a clear and perhaps unintended illustration of preventative humanitarian action, as opposed to humanitarian intervention."' Yet, it does not appear that the United Nations intended to set'a precedent in Haiti. Nonetheless, as the discussion below will illustrate, such a precedent was set.
F. The Central African Republic (CAR)
The case of the CAR is important to examine because similar to the ECOWAS mission in Liberia, it was the second time that: (1) the whole of the international community supported humanitarian intervention by a group of states in a purely internal conflict; (2) the United Nations had codeployed forces with an operation already underway; and (3) the Security Council retroactively authorized a unilateral intervention which entailed the use of force, thus placing a retroactive de jure seal on the intervention. More important however, the case of the CAR again evidences the international community's acceptance of humanitarian intervention by groups of states when a democratic regime has been violently and illegally dislodged.
Since April 18, 1996, the CAR has been shaken by a series of mutinies orchestrated by members of the French trained Central African Armed Forces, "stemming to a large extent from widespread public discontent over social and economic problems exacerbated by prolonged non-payment of salary arrears." ' 152 Many public servants, including members of the armed forces, had been demanding payment of salary arrears from 1992.153 According to Premier Jean-Paul Ngoupande, the mutineers sought to overthrow the government of President Ange-Felix Patasse. [Vol. 12.2
France, said to have had 2500 legionnaires in the country, took the leading role in quashing the mutinies. 15 French troops are said to have used Puma helicopters to launch a "furious retaliatory attack on rebel positions," killing more civilians than mutineers. 5 As a result, the French intervention came under serious scrutiny in Paris, as "Defense Minister Charles Millon's predecessor, Franqois Leotard, called for a parliamentary debate ... [and] ... Socialist leader Lionel Jospin said the secret defense pact with Bangui was supposed to be activated only by external attack., 157 Amidst growing pressure from Paris and President Patasse for a French withdrawal from the CAR, in late September 1997, French troops began to depart.
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In late January 1997, pursuant to requests made by President Patasse at the Nineteenth Summit of Heads of State and Government of France and Africa, and following the Conference on Consensus-building and Dialog, the Heads of State of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali established the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB).'-9 On February 8, 1997, MISAB deployed 800 troops to the CAR to restore peace and security and to "monitor the implementation of the Bangui Agreements, and [to conduct] operations to disarm the former rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed individuals."' 6 Under the military command of Gabon and with logistical and financial support from France and the Organization of African Unity, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Senegal and Togo participated in the mission. 16 On August 6, 1997, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1125, which deemed the situation in the CAR a threat to international peace and security and authorized Member States participating in MISAB to take enforcement action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel.1 6 2 The Security Council adopted three additional resolutions which extended MISAB's mandate to take enforcement action to guarantee the security and movement of its personnel.' On March 27, 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1159 creating the United Nations' Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)," to assist in the maintenance of peace, security, law and order, and protect key installations in Bangui; to monitor the disarmament process; to ensure security and freedom of movement of U.N. personnel and the safety and security of U.N. property; and to provide police training for the national police and technical support to national electoral bodies.
6 5 The Security Council mandated Secretary-General Kofi Annan to "secure a smooth transition between MISAB and MINURCA by 15 April 1998. ' 66 Kofi Annan selected Oluyemi Adeniji, a Nigerian, to be his special representative to the CAR. 167 The MISAB intervention in the CAR appears to have been legal because President Patasse was in de facto control of the state when he requested external assistance, and the mission seems to have been carried out in a neutral fashion. Some reports have suggested that MISAB was discredited because it failed to disarm Patasse's loyalist militias, many of whom "wearing MISAB insignia have plundered villages . . . . ,,.6' Nevertheless, since the member states of MISAB took unilateral enforcement action without authorization from the Security Council, the intervention would have to be deemed unlawful under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, unless it can be shown that they properly invoked a right to humanitarian intervention.
Although the mutinies spawned violent conflict between the Central African Armed Forces, French legionnaires, and mutineer-rebels, it cannot be said that there were wide spread human rights abuses of the type that would justify humanitarian intervention. Nor did the fighting cause Patesse's government to collapse, although it did fold to some degree, causing the state to slide into a state of chaos.1 6 9 Likewise, the mutineers were not successful at "fully" dislodging Patasse's democratically elected regime, an important prerequisite to humanitarian intervention. Therefore, since none of the normative criteria discussed earlier appear to be satisfied, the MISAB intervention would not appear to qualify as a lawful humanitarian intervention.
Conversely, since Patasse's government was barely able to maintain law and order, [Vol. 12.2 ernment forces and the military rebels had engulfed the country, MISAB seems to have been entitled to intervene to forestall the fighting and avert state collapse and absolute anarchy. 71 Moreover, as the above discussion shows, the international community appears willing to condone intervention to defend and safeguard democratic institutions. Whether such a right would fit under the purview of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention or some other norm of international law is unclear. As stated above, this would seem to depend on how the civilian population of a state reacts to a challenge to the regime in power, and based on this, whether the civilian population would be threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale. As the above discussion shows, any time the latter condition can be confirmed, state's practice suggests that intervention is lawful when alleviating such conditions (United Nations in Haiti and ECOWAS in Sierra Leone).
In conclusion, the case of the CAR represents the second instance in which the Security Council has retroactively placed a de jure seal on a prior unilateral intervention which entailed the use of force by a group of states, and co-deployed forces with an operation already underway. Furthermore, it was the second time that the whole of the international community supported unilateral humanitarian intervention by a group of states in a purely internal conflict. Hence, in order to avert the consequences of civil war, the case of the CAR taken together with the cases of Liberia and Haiti evidence that the international community may condone humanitarian intervention by groups of states when democratic governments are being violently and illegally dislodged.
IV. ECOWAS AND THE CASE OF SIERRA LEONE: NEW
CRITERIA?
There is no question that the international community's responses to the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone were influenced by the actions of ECOWAS in Liberia, MISAB in the CAR, the U.S. and allied operation in Iraq, and U.N. action in Liberia, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti, and the CAR. Taken together, the above case studies evidence that, regardless of the legal basis for intervention, humanitarian intervention by groups of states, regional actors, or the United Nations in internal conflicts appears lawful.
The ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone raises several legal questions, some of which parallel those discussed above and others which do not.' Just as it had done in Liberia, ECOWAS militarily intervened in Si-MISAB, as it would have interfered with the civilian populaces right to self-determination. See Schachter, supra note 30, at 1641; see also Doswald-Beck, supra note 82, at 195-96. 171. It is estimated that several hundred civilians died in the fighting. See Car: Echoes of Zaire, supra note 152.
172. This section will not include a detailed analysis of the events which led to the conflict in Sierra Leone. erra Leone without U.N. authorization. 173 However, unlike the Liberian case, it is unclear whether ECOWAS was entitled to invoke a right to humanitarian intervention, although there is some evidence to support this notion. Notwithstanding, it appears that ECOWAS can justify intervention on other grounds.
The case of Sierra Leone further evidences the following points: (1) that customary international law seems to recognize a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention by states or regional actors in internal conflicts; and (2) that humanitarian intervention may be justified when a group of states or regional actor attempts to restore democracy to a state which has been violently and illegally dislodged (or collapsed and is sliding into anarchy) against the will of its populace, especially when a population is threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale. This contention is supported by the international community's support for the U.N. missions in Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the CAR, the interventions by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the MISAB mission in the CAR. However, any invocation of a right to humanitarian intervention to "defend" or "safeguard" democracy would only seem permissible when the civilian population of a state is threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale. Without the latter condition, any intervention aimed at defending, safeguarding or restoring democracy as opposed to law and order would appear to fall outside the realm of humanitarian intervention.
A.Background
In February and March of 1996, in the midst of a civil war, Sierra Leone held its first parliamentary and presidential elections in thirty years. [Vol. 12.2 bah came into power. 175 In spite of the election, fighting between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front, which contested the election, continued. On November 30, 1996, the Government of C6te d'Ivoire, ECOWAS, 76 the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Commonwealth States facilitated peace-talks which culminated into the Abidjan Accord, ending the civil war.
On May 25, 1997, approximately six months after the war, several junior military officers led by Major Johnny Koromah successfully overthrew the democratically elected government of President Kabbah, forcing him to flee to Guinea.
7 Before fleeing, President Kabbah officially requested that Nigeria and ECOWAS intervene and restore him to power.'78
During the coup, in order to prevent a counter-offensive by the Nigerian Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG) and ECOMOG, Koromah's forces tactically attacked both contingents.1
79 The coup appears to have been successful due to complicity by NIFAG officers who unintentionally leaked information revealing when there would be a change of NIFAG guard units with other units stationed on the outskirts of Monrovia, Liberia.
The whole of the international community condemned the coup. On March 16, 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1156 which terminated prohibitions on the sale or supply of petroleum and petroleum products to Sierra Leone.
1 87 On April 17, 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1162 which commended ECOMOG for restoring peace to Sierra Leone and authorized "the deployment, with immediate effect, of up to ten United Nations' military liaisons and security advisory personnel" to assist ECOMOG in the "identification of the former combatant elements to be disarmed and the design of a disarmament plan, as well as to perform other related security tasks. '' 8 t Further, the resolution encouraged the Secretary-General to "submit to the Security Council recommendations on the [Vol. 12.2 possible deployment... of United Nations' military personnel. ' " 1 89 Before discussing the legality of intervention in Sierra Leone, the following points must be made. First, before the coup, there were two separate military contingents in Sierra Leone, NIFAG and ECOMOG. However, after the coup, both forces integrated, making it difficult to distinguish them.' 9°S econd, pursuant to SOFA, it was Nigeria and not ECOWAS who militarily engaged the junta in an attempt to restore law and order to Sierra Leone. 1 9 1 Last, it appears that many NIFAG troops were on "loan" from ECOMOG, meaning that many Nigerian soldiers performed in a dual capacity, serving both NIFAG 9 and ECOMOG. 1 9 3
B. The Nigerian Intervention
As previously mentioned, immediately after the coup, in an attempt to ward off hostile junta troops, NIFAG engaged the military junta. Both NIFAG troops and Nigerian-ECOMOG troops assigned to NIFAG participated.
Unilateral intervention by Nigeria appears to have been lawful for three reasons: (1) President Kabbah requested that Nigeria intervene to restore democracy; (2) the SOFA between Nigeria and Sierra Leone permits intervention in the event of an internal threat to the state; and (3) Nigeria was obligated and permitted to intervene under the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993.
International law recognizes the right of an incumbent government to request military assistance from a third state in order to offset an illegal prior intervention by another state.94 However, absent a defense pact (SOFA), and claims of humanitarian intervention aside, international law does not permit "forcible military intervention" by a third state in the purely internal affairs of another state.95 In this context, wanting the above, Nigeria would be unable to justify using NIFAG forces stationed in Sierra Leone or reinforcements to oust the junta and reinstate the de jure government to power.
However, since the SOFA between the two countries sanctioned intervention, the intervention appears to have been lawful. According to the terms of SOFA, "NIFAG shall have the right to apply force in the sustenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Sierra Leone."' 96 Hence, Nigeria-NIFAG troops were obliged to attempt to restore stability to the Republic, and given the illegality and unpopularity of the coup, create the conditions so that the de jure government could return to power." From this view, Nigeria was justified in sending reinforcements and using force to protect its citizens and fulfill its obligations under SOFA. International law recognizes the right of sovereign states to protect the rights of their citizens abroad. 198 For that reason, Nigeria seems to have been entitled to send reinforcements to protect NIFAG soldiers and their families.
Moreover, Nigeria was justified in proportionately responding to repeated attacks by junta forces on NIFAG "security stations" and personnel. 1 ' 9 Finally, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 seems to confirm the legality of the Nigerian intervention." Under Article 58 of the Treaty, member states "undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region" and pledge to "co-operate with the Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-State and inter-State conflict .... ,"0' Moreover, Article 58 calls on member states to "establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate." 2 2 Hence, according to the Treaty, Nigeria was obligated to send peace-keeping forces to Sierra Leone to restore law and order and prevent the state from descending into anarchy. at 447; Doswald-Beck, supra note 82, at 251 (1986).
For the above stated reasons, the Nigerian intervention appears to have been lawful. Moreover, the fact that the United Nations did not reprimand Nigeria for taking unilateral action lends credence to its validity.
C. The ECOWAS Intervention
The ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone seems to be justified on several grounds, all of which fall within the purview of the generally recognized exceptions to the principle of non-interference. Forcible military intervention by ECOWAS appears to be justified for the following reasons: (1) President Kabbah requested that ECOWAS intervene; (2) ECOWAS appears to have been entitled to invoke a right to humanitarian intervention; (3) ECOWAS was permitted to intervene under the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993; (4) ECOWAS may have acquired the requisite legal status to enable it to act as a de jure government; and (5) the Security Council retroactively authorized the intervention.
As previously stated, under international law, an incumbent de jure regime is entitled to request outside assistance (military equipment, but not troop support) to quell internal disorder, as long as the disorder has not matured into civil war, and the rebels are not in de facto control of the state.
has been violently and illegally dislodged against the will and to the detriment of its civilian population, current trends (United Nations/United States in Haiti, MISAB in the CAR and ECOWAS in Sierra Leone) verify that humanitarian intervention may be justified. Again, for such an intervention to be lawful, the population would have to be threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale, the case of Sierra Leone being the better example.
Paradoxically, the international community has demonstrated its willingness to support forcible intervention in the internal affairs of states (Haiti, the CAR and Sierra Leone) to safeguard democracy, without there being a genuine threat to international peace and security. Moreover, in none of the above cases did the junta commit human rights abuses so heinous as to violate the jus cogens norms of international law, nor did any of the states slide into anarchy. One explanation for this inconsistency may be that the international community is witnessing the development of a new norm of international law, namely, the recognition of a right to democratic governance. According to Tes6n, Western nations have accepted the principle of democracy as a rule which is fully enforceable by international law:
There can be little doubt that a principle of democratic rule is today part of international law. While in a universal context the recognition of the principle has only had the effect of subtracting the question of democratic rule from the exclusive jurisdiction of states, the nations in Europe and the Americas have evaluated the principle of democracy to the category of a rule which is full enforceable through appropriate regional collective mechanisms. The cases of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and Liberia and MISAB in the CAR demonstrate that many African states have also accepted the principal of democracy as a rule enforceable through regional collective mechanisms. As a result, in certain circumstances, international law today seems to recognize the existence of a right to democratic governance as an exception to the principle of non-intervention. However, such an exception would only appear lawful when, for example, undemocratic means are employed to unseat a democratic government, and such an unseating threatens the stability of a state and its domestic populace.' On this issue, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, "Africa can no longer tolerate, and accept as fait accompli, coups against elected governments, and the illegal seizure of power by military cliques, who sometimes act for sectional interests, sometimes simply for their own." 206. Again, democratic institutions are those which enjoy unimpeded support from the bulk of a state's populace. Hence, an "unelected" government which satisfies the above criterion may still be democratic. [Vol. 12.2 nority view.
In this context, international law would not permit intervention by states individually to restore or safeguard democracy, but alternatively, may permit unilateral intervention by groups of states or regional actors. Certainly, international support for the interventions in Haiti, the CAR and Sierra Leone support this contention.
As previously mentioned, unlike the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 permits its member states to establish a regional peace-keeping force to resolve internal conflicts. 2 u 8 That being the case, and considering that Sierra Leone is a member of ECOWAS, the community was justified in mandating ECOMOG to restore law and order to Sierra Leone.
ECOWAS-ECOMOG may have acquired the requisite legal status to entitle it to a right of self-defense. Since many ECOMOG soldiers functioned in dual roles, serving both in NIFAG and ECOMOG,' they were indiscriminately targeted by Koromah's junta. Thus, prior to Kabbah's request that ECOWAS intervene to restore law and order, 21 0 ECOMOG troops and the junta had already clashed.
2 ' Accordingly, in consonance with the international right of self-defense, ECOMOG forces acted lawfully when they defended themselves against the junta.
1 2 ECOMOG appears to have had a two-tiered right of self-defense. First, as mentioned above, under international law, ECOMOG troops were entitled to protect themselves and community property. Consequently, they were also fit to engage "unruly" junta forces which attempted to prevent them from fulfilling their mandate.
3 Second, under international law, governments have an inherent right to defend the states they represent, regardless of whether the threat is internal or external."' It is therefore unlikely that a regional actor whose personnel and assets have been attacked by military elements in a host state would be entitled to act as a de jure government and quash the rebellion. Under international law, regional actors are not considered to have an independent legal personality, and therefore may not claim or invoke the same rights as states. 5 Stated differently, regional actors may not possess any powers not granted to them by their members, and states may not confer powers they do not maintain. Nonetheless, international law is silent on the issue of whether a regional actor could "acquire" the requisite legal personality to entitle it to act as a government. In the case of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS may have attained the requisite legal personality. Here, the junta leadership was aware that ECOMOG would attempt to quell the coup, and as a result strategically attacked ECOMOG headquarters and troops. The junta was no doubt threatened by ECOMOG's presence, as ECOMOG maintained enough military might to thwart the coup. In this sense, both the de jure government and ECOMOG were targeted by the junta. Furthermore, ECOMOG could not rely on the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone to protect it, since it was the very group that staged the revolt.
After the coup, ECOMOG and NIFAG troops stationed in Sierra Leone quickly set up key posts around Freetown, in effect limiting the junta's sphere of influence. ECOMOG was the only de facto authority, as it controlled more territory than Koromah's rebels and was the only entity capable of restoring and maintaining law and order. ECOMOG functioned as ex officio state administrator, 216 mediator, and peace-enforcer. Taken together, the above facts suggest that by August 1997, ECOMOG may have developed the requisite legal personality to entitle it to act as a quasi-de jure government and to take all necessary measures to restore constitutional order to the state.
Although the Security Council did not authorize ECOWAS-ECOMOG to take enforcement action, it supported forcible intervention by ECOWAS On October 8, 1997, two months after the ECOWAS intervention, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1132. The resolution stated "that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment., 21 8 In addition, it imposed travel restrictions on members of the "military junta and adult members of their families," to prevent them from fleeing the state. Five years after co-deploying forces with ECOMOG in Liberia, and several months after the MISAB intervention, Resolution 1132 demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, the United Nations and the international community support and, in certain instances, encourage unilateral humanitarian intervention by groups of states and regional actors in purely internal conflicts. The Sierra Leone case represents the fifth instance (the other four being Liberia, Somalia, Haiti and the CAR) in which the Security Council has deemed an indisputably internal conflict a threat to international peace and security. 22 ' Just as Security Council Resolution 788 appears to have placed a retroactive de jure seal on the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, and Resolution 1125 on the MISAB intervention in the CAR, Resolution 1132 seems to have done the same in Sierra Leone.
In addition, Security Council Resolution 1162 marked the first time that the United Nations co-deployed (UNOMIL) with a peace-keeping operation already set up by another organization (ECOMOG-Liberia) 22 ' To the extent that the cases of Liberia and the CAR can be used as an indicator of future events, it is probable that the United Nations will co-deploy military personnel with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. Yet, depending on the scope of the duties presently being performed by the U.N. "military liaison" and "security advisory personnel" in Sierra Leone, such a co-deployment may already be underway.
V. CONCLUSION
As the above discussion delineates, today's customary international law appears to permit humanitarian intervention by groups of states or regional actors in internal conflicts in three instances: (1) when human rights abuses are so grave that the jus cogens norms of international law have been violated; (2) when a state has collapsed and is sliding into a state of anarchy; 22 4 and (3) to safeguard democracy when a democratic government has been violently and illegally dislodged against the will of its civilian population.
Taken together, the above case studies demonstrate that today, in certain instances, the international community has accepted the principle of unilateral humanitarian intervention. As a result, there can be no question that the customary international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention survived the post U.N. era. In addition, the fact that the Security Council has been used as a mechanism to "countersign" unilateral humanitarian intervention on three separate occasions (Liberia, the CAR and Sierra Leone) renders moot arguments to the contrary. Clearly, the international community has demonstrated its willingness to entrust certain peace-enforcement missions to regional actors. And, as verified by the overwhelming support for the ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the MISAB intervention in the CAR, the international community seems eager to have African states take a leading role in the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts. 2 5 This is particularly true in the case of South Africa, which will take an undoubtedly more active role in enforcing the peace in the future as it asserts itself as a regional hegemon. Perhaps this explains why the interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the CAR met with little controversy, resistance, and scrutiny by the international community.
As Schachter asserts, "[i]t is probable that peacekeeping actions and perhaps limited enforcement will be employed by regional organizations more frequently in the future ... [and be used] ... to provide order to a country in internal conflict or near-anarchy. ' 2 6 This assertion is best supported by requests from the United Nations that regional organizations take a more active role in the maintenance of international peace and security. 227 For example, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 49/57 of December 9, 1994, "encourages regional arrangements and agencies to consider ways and means to promote closer cooperation and coordination with the United Nations, in particular in the fields of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building, and, where appropriate, peace-keeping. ''2 8 The ECOWAS and MISAB interventions demonstrated that Africans 225. This was the impetus behind the creation of the U.S.-led African Crisis Response Initiative, which was created to enhance African peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capacity by providing training and equipment (primarily communications) to African countries where the military accepts the supremacy of democratic civilian government and where there is a commitment to peacekeeping. The primary goal of the initiative is to create rapidly-deployable, interoperable units from stable and democratic countries. ECOWAS has strongly contributed to spurring what appears to be new norms of customary international law, specifically with regard to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Taken together, the ECOWAS, MISAB, and U.N. interventions demonstrate a consistent pattern of commonality in action among states. This commonality evidences that there has been a shift in the law de lege ferenda, permitting unilateral humanitarian intervention by groups of states and regional actors in internal conflicts.
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